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This paper1 is essentially an empirical analysis of state and civil society responses in Tamil 
Nadu (India) to the tsunami of December 26, 2004.The paper examines interventions by 
state and non-state agencies, as well as people’s experiences in the relief and 
rehabilitation phases to identify factors influencing both positive and negative outcomes 
of the tsunami response. Issues related to vulnerability and exclusion, equity, 
transparency and accountability in different sectors of disaster intervention are explored 
to highlight themes revolving around reach and efficacy of relief and recovery processes. 
These analyses bring out some interesting lessons with regard to the importance of 
institutional autonomy, non-politicized decision making, and synergetic state-civil society 
interfaces in fostering inclusive, transparent and accountable rehabilitation processes. The 
roles played by institutional responsiveness and flexibility in shaping an effective disaster 
response also emerge very clearly from this study of the Tamil Nadu experience. Another 
crucial finding points to the need for detailed, reliable and disaggregated geo-
demographic and socio-economic records as a resource base for informing relief and 
rehabilitation interventions. The study draws extensively from the experiences and 
insights of people affected by, and involved in tsunami response, and from secondary 
knowledge resources available on the disaster.   
 
Introduction 
It was a devastating earthquake off the coast of Sumatra in the Indonesian 
archipelago, of magnitude 9.0 on the Richter Scale, followed by one of magnitude 7.3 on 
the Richter Scale 81 kilometers off Pulo Kunji, Great Nicobar, India, that resulted in 
massive tsunamis in several countries in South Asia and East Africa — Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
India, Thailand, Somalia, Myanmar, Maldives, Malaysia, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Kenya and 
Seychelles.  
In India, the tsunami affected nearly 2,260 kilometers of the mainland coastline 
(Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Pondicherry), as well as the Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands, with tidal waves up to 10 meters high penetrating up to 3 kilometers inland, taking 
at least 10,749 lives (“Special SITREP 35”, 2005, para.1) and affecting more than 2.79 
million people across 1089 villages (“2.79 million”, n.d.) 
In Tamil Nadu2, the worst affected state on the mainland, over 8010 deaths were 
reported. Thirteen districts were hit by the tsunami, of which, Nagapattinam, Kanyakumari 
and Cuddalore were the worst affected, with a death toll of 6065, 828 and 617 
respectively. In all, according to the GoTN (Government of Tamil Nadu), 984,564 people 
were affected with over 8,000 deaths and 126,182 homes being damages/destroyed. In 
addition more than 3,400 people have reported missing (“Tsunami – The Killer waves”, 
2005). 
In Tamil Nadu, one thousand kilometers (kms) of the coastline were affected, with 
water penetrating up to 1 – 1.5 kms inland and causing extensive damage to nearly 19,168 
hectares3 of cropped area. In addition, Tamil Nadu also suffered substantial losses in terms 
of loss of livelihoods—loss of assets such as boats and other fishery related assets, loss of 
livestock, disruption of the fisheries sector, traditional market links and other livelihoods 
linked to the coastal economy, and damage to other resources such as pasture and grazing 
lands. The tsunami also caused extensive damage to social infrastructure, community 
assets, harbors, and transport, power and communication infrastructure. 
This paper is based on a study conducted in four tsunami affected districts4 of 
Tamil Nadu nearly a year after the tsunami. The primary objective of the study, and of this 
paper, is to analyze and bring together the experiences and learnings of a range of actors 
affected by, and involved in the disaster response in order to identify factors that influence 
effectiveness and reach of the relief and rehabilitation processes. These analyses include 
examinations of the state and civil society responses, key issues relating to the relief and 
rehabilitation processes, and transparency and accountability concerns. The paper relies on 
fieldwork, discussions with key actors in the tsunami response, and also draws from the 
wealth of material available with various agencies on the tsunami.  
A. The State Response  
At the very outset, it is important to stress that, as a phenomenon, the tsunami was 
one that was beyond the pale of experience of the State apparatus. Despite an initial 
paralysis due to the nature and sheer scale of the disaster, compounded by the breakdown 
of communications channels, the State and District level administrations5 swung into action 
by noon 26 December 2004, with the first government orders (GOs) regarding relief and 
rehabilitation packages being issued on the 28th December 2005.  
Bringing in the Armed Forces for search and rescue operations, and moving on to 
organizing relief camps and announcing ex-gratia payments6, the government, in the relief 
phase, is to be noted for averting a large-scale public health crisis despite thousands being 
housed in relief camps, and extensive destruction of essential infrastructure. In the 
rehabilitation phase, the state’s efforts have largely focused on housing and livelihood 
rehabilitation, with a massive reconstruction program well underway. Requirements of 
vulnerable groups7 such as children, destitute individuals and women have also been 
addressed to an extent.   
Critical Institutional Factors  
To enhance the response capacity of the administration, a number of carefully 
chosen personnel from various departments across the State were put in place at various 
levels and also given considerable decision making powers. In Nagapattinam, the worst 
affected district, eleven teams, each comprising one Indian Administrative Services (IAS) 
officer, senior officials from departments such as Health, Agriculture, Public Works etc, and 
headed by a Minister of the State Government, were formed to assess damages, coordinate 
relief processes, and distribute ex-gratia in specific village clusters. Such teams, working on 
similar lines, were formed in other districts as well. These teams, which were in place for a 
month, were given administrative and financial powers to enable quick response to the 
situation on the ground. They also established linkages with civil society responders, and in 
all, have been recognized for the vital role they played in ensuring effective relief 
processes.  
Across the state, postings of senior officers to the affected districts were executed 
rapidly, with personnel being chosen for their competency, commitment, integrity, and 
familiarity with local conditions and affected communities. The state government promptly 
devolved financial and administrative powers, with District Collectors being authorized to 
draw up to 10 million rupees to deal with a range of immediate requirements according to 
their discretion. The administrative and financial devolution was extended to lower levels 
also (such as officers responsible for relief camps), facilitating rapid and locally adapted 
decision-making. Further, while political representatives did accompany relief teams, there 
seem to have been clear guidelines issued from the top (the State Government) that led to 
minimal political interference in the relief process that was largely driven by the 
administration. It is stressed by many observers that the key to a strong institutional 
response after the initial paralysis lay in the above conditions being met.  
This level of administrative autonomy and lack of political interference has 
continued even through the rehabilitation phase, and coupled with an efficient and less 
bureaucratic leadership handpicked to lead the tsunami response, is said to have made 
GoTN’s response, despite several shortcomings, more effective as compared to other 
states, and according to one observer, even some other countries. Further, the Tamil Nadu 
experience shows that an efficient administration empowered with sufficient autonomy can 
actually compensate for shortcomings in the policy framework8. It is also recognized that it 
was a clear message from the strong political leadership recognizing the importance of 
autonomy and protecting the administration from political interference that was crucial in 
fostering this facilitative environment.  
These institutional factors have translated into a high degree of government 
responsiveness to the situation on the ground. The administration has been extremely 
proactive in engaging with civil society in terms of partnering with a range of non-
government agencies in the relief and rehabilitation processes, as well as in being 
extremely receptive to feedback regarding policy frameworks and efficacy of rehabilitation 
processes. Coordination mechanisms have been set up for liaison with civil society, and 
bureaucratic procedures cut down drastically. This responsiveness has also meant an 
enhanced people – administration interface: (a) group discussions in affected communities 
conducted by Collectors in the initial days; (b) regular field visits; (c) weekly grievance 
days; (d) officers specially designated to handle particular aspects of relief and 
reconstruction to enable a disaggregated response to grievances; these officers’ contact 
details are made public through the local media etc.  
It must be noted here that elected village panchayats9 have not been really visible 
and central in the response efforts. It is believed by many observers that these elected 
bodies have been bypassed, albeit quietly, in an attempt to keep the relief and 
rehabilitation process in the hands of the administration rather than vest it in elected, i.e, 
political bodies, and thus minimize the chances of politicizing the relief and reconstruction 
process. However, this move has been much questioned and debated on the grounds that 
these are democratic bodies, perhaps the best suited to implement an equitable 
rehabilitation process.  
B. Civil Society Responses 
In the wake of the tsunami, civil society, in India and abroad, rose to the occasion, 
with communities, individuals, bilateral donor agencies, international, national and local 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic institutions, political groups, the media, 
religious trusts, interest groups with membership bases in the affected communities, and 
the corporate sector mobilizing to respond to the needs of the tsunami-affected areas.  
To begin with, the general public and civil society organizations brought in with 
them substantial amounts of resources and expertise to help provide immediate relief to 
the affected people, and were engaged in a whole spectrum of activities — rescue, 
retrieval and disposal of bodies and debris, provision of food and essential medical care, 
construction of temporary shelters, psycho-social interventions, setting up relief camps, 
etc. One of the major contributions of the civil society organizations has been their ability 
to fill crucial gaps at the time of relief and rescue. For instance, while the government 
could mobilize large quantities of food-grain, it was civil society organizations that were 
able to mobilize essentials such as children’s clothing, underwear, sanitary pads and baby 
food. 
Civil society engagement in tsunami response has continued into the rehabilitation 
phase, with non-government agencies extensively involved in not only in planning, 
resourcing and implementing rehabilitation programs10, but also in influencing state policy 
to shape it in a manner that addresses people’s real needs. For instance, it was civil society 
that was instrumental in bringing to the government’s attention that coastal communities 
comprised not only fish workers, but also a range of other groups involved in diverse 
occupations, which had all been affected in various ways by the tsunami.  
Civil society organizations have been proactive in highlighting the specific and 
precise needs of communities through intervention, research and documentation, bringing 
to light instances of exclusion, and in advocating for the rights of vulnerable groups such as 
Dalits11, non-fish workers, women and the aged. They also have played crucial roles in 
giving feedback to the administration regarding shortcomings and malpractice in various 
rehabilitation processes, and in bringing to the government’s attention any negative 
implications of state policies12. At this juncture, it must be noted that the government, in 
general, has been proactive in taking corrective measures and passing the necessary 
directives. 
In addition to organizations directly involved in the relief and reconstruction work, 
there are also a number of groups and collectives that focus entirely on independent 
analysis of policy and practice, using the media, the courts, and mobilizing affected people 
and communities to highlight key issues of concern. Given their non-involvement in the 
actual administration of relief and rehabilitation, they often act as watchdogs trying to 
examine the situation from wider perspectives that distance can often bring, but are of 
course unable to always appreciate the challenges faced while actually trying to implement 
policy or operationalize standards and plans.  
C. The State and Civil Society: Interfaces, Synergies and Conflicts 
The response to the tsunami has seen an extraordinary level of synergy between 
various actors – government and non-government. It can be stressed that coordination, 
dialogue and information sharing between civil society organizations and the government 
have gone a long way in enhancing the effectiveness and reach of the response.  
Right from the beginning, the administration was open to working in tandem with a 
range of civil society groups. This was seen during the relief phase, with the specially 
appointed teams regularly meeting, and proactively welcoming feedback from civil society 
groups. In addition, the administration also played a crucial role in coordinating 
interventions by NGOs to avoid duplication, and often sought their (NGOs) help in filling 
gaps in the government response. Such close engagement has continued through the 
response processes, with civil society working closely with the state in direct interventions, 
as well as in providing policy related feedback and input. The government, on its part, has 
been extremely responsive to civil society’s concerns, as is visible in the constant evolution 
of tsunami GOs based on field information from various civil society sources, including the 
media. 
The entire state –civil society interface appears to be built around two key principles 
adopted by the government: 
a. Accessibility – The highest levels of the administration at the District and State 
levels were very willing to meet, listen to and pay attention to the issues and 
concerns raised by civil society, as well as accept several of their 
recommendations. 
b. Inclusiveness – The government has worked actively to create spaces and 
mechanisms for civil society organizations to participate effectively.  
The Public-Private Partnership Framework 
One such mechanism is the public-private partnership framework adopted by the 
government for the rehabilitation process. Under this framework, civil society organizations 
were invited to invest in and partner with the government in livelihood rehabilitation, and 
housing and infrastructure reconstruction.  
This partnership has been widely adopted especially for housing reconstruction – 
the government is responsible for providing land and basic infrastructure13, while civil 
society organizations are to provide resources for, and undertake the actual construction 
process. If for a particular habitation no civil society organization comes through to 
undertake construction, then the affected people themselves would be permitted to do so 
with financial and technical assistance from the state. The government is to undertake 
construction only in cases in which both NGOs and beneficiaries are not forthcoming14. 
Co-ordination Forums 
Co-ordination mechanisms have been established at the District level (and at the 
State level at a later stage) to better leverage the expertise of civil society and optimize 
the use of resources. Co-ordination bodies15 that bring together a wide range of civil society 
organizations and the administration were set-up in Nagapattinam, Kanyakumari and 
Chennai by the joint initiative of certain NGOs and the Collectorate. In other districts too, 
co-ordination meetings are organized regularly.  
The single most important feature of these co-ordination bodies is that they have a 
strong working relationship with the administration. They help ensure a constant interface 
between the administration and civil society groups (and between civil society groups 
themselves), and usually have the following objectives: 
a. Coordinating rehabilitation efforts by civil society organizations and the 
government to maximize potentials and avoid duplication; 
b. Sharing knowledge, perspectives, information and expertise; 
c. Discussing rehabilitation issues and giving feedback to the government.  
Effective co-ordination is not just a felt need of the civil society organizations involved, 
but also greatly assists the administration in ensuring more effective resource allocation 
and planning, and has the potential to greatly reduce duplication and wastage of resources. 
A very interesting aspect of the experience of the district level co-ordination mechanisms is 
the role played by the District Collector in shaping civil society interventions through these 
forums. If the experience in Tamil Nadu is any indication, then for such co-ordination 
mechanisms to be effective, key personnel such as the District Collector must have 
sufficient knowledge of and understanding regarding the work and dynamics of civil society 
organizations as well as possess good facilitation and co-ordination skills.   
One of criticisms leveled at the co-ordination and interface forums is that they are 
democratic only in name, and in effect, are controlled by the administration. It is pointed 
out that these co-ordination bodies have largely restricted themselves to logistical issues, 
and have not served as forums where substantive and policy impacting discussions occur. It 
is also pointed that the presence of these co-ordination bodies has not enhanced the overall 
transparency of either the government or non-government agencies. However, given their 
role in facilitating better communication and maximizing potentials, there is clearly a need 
for these mechanisms to not only continue, but also become stronger, as well as expand the 
scope of their functioning to include transparency and accountability related concerns.  
Co-ordination and advocacy networks of a different nature can also be found in 
Tamil Nadu. The Tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation Co-ordination (TRRC) is a forum that 
brings together a large number of local NGOs, social movements and affected peoples’ 
organizations from across Tamil Nadu, mostly with a focus on strengthening advocacy and 
coordinating efforts to influence policy and practice in the relief, reconstruction and 
rehabilitation process. The TRRC focuses its efforts on mobilizing affected communities to 
ensure effective rights-based rehabilitation and development. Some of the organizations 
affiliated to the TRRC are also involved in the implementation of housing and livelihood 
rehabilitation. The TRRC also engages in policy overview, looking at relevance, standards, 
as well as transparent and democratic functioning of both government and non-government 
agencies. 
Civil Society Interventions: Conflicts and Debates 
The extent of networking and synergy visible between state and non-state actors in 
the tsunami response is not equally visible when it comes to relationships between various 
civil society actors. Given the diversity in institutional natures, orientation and 
perspectives, and extent of financial, human and technical resources available, co-
ordination across the spectrum of civil society organizations has posed several challenges.  
At one end of the spectrum are organizations that invest heavily and are intensely 
involved in rehabilitation-related work, typically share a strong working relationship with 
the government, and are often affiliated to co-ordination cells such as the NCRC. At the 
other end of the spectrum are Co-ordination Cells like the TRRC, which pursue an activist 
agenda and have taken on a monitoring role, often not hesitating to openly criticize the 
work of the government as well as some of the larger agencies, development organizations 
and INGOs engaged in relief and rehabilitation work. 
Conversations with INGOs and the larger development organizations clearly reveal 
that many of them view the TRRC and many of the associated organizations as 
‘confrontationist’ and difficult to work with, and that they perceive themselves as more 
‘constructive’ in their approach than those associated with the TRRC. 
On the other hand, there seems to be a perception that co-ordination cells such as 
the NCRC are ‘pro-government’ rather than pro-people, and that they are often co-opted 
by the government. Apparently their investments and involvement in the rehabilitation 
processes create the need to maintain smooth relations with the government, and 
therefore, they refrain from taking up controversial issues that could antagonize the 
administration. While at one hand this could indeed be true, people associated with these 
co-ordination cells point out that this perception probably stems from the fact that they, 
having direct access to the upper echelons of the administration, do not usually need to 
make a hue and cry about their stand, or take it to the media.  
Despite the vast differences among them, these apparently conflicting networks of 
organizations are actually complementary to each other — in any rehabilitation process, 
both activist organizations and development organizations have roles to play. Despite this 
truism, efforts to get the two ends of the spectrum to work together have been rather 
futile, with diverse kinds of civil society organizations arrayed along various axes rather 
than forming a loop that feeds into and complements each other’s work. 
Co-ordination between various organizations involved in direct rehabilitation has 
also been lacking, largely due to issues related to competition, and an unwillingness to 
share information.  These conflicts and difficulties in coordinating interventions have had 
negative implications in terms of accountability to people and an undermining of response 
efforts, and pose a challenge that needs to be addressed on a priority basis.  
C. Post-Tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation: Key Areas of Concern 
The tsunami left in its wake unprecedented destruction of life and resources and 
posed a huge challenge to the State and civil society, both of which have demonstrated a 
positive intent as well as informed and decisive action. A synergy of their mutual strengths 
has been an important factor in ensuring the development of a meaningful and strategic 
response. While response efforts in Tamil Nadu have been by and large recognized as having 
been comparatively effective and successful, it remains a fact that there are several issues 
related to the relief and rehabilitation processes that are a cause for concern, and that 
need to be critically delved into as an initial step towards drawing vital lessons that can be 
taken forward to other disaster situations.  
Immediate Response and Relief 
The relief phase saw the government, NGOs, local public, religious groups, hospitals 
etc., launch an intensive effort to rescue people, retrieve and cremate or bury bodies, 
clear debris, transport people to relief camps, organize medical facilities, make 
arrangements for food, water and sanitation, and extend psychosocial care. The Armed 
Forces were brought in for search and rescue operations, and special measures were taken 
to avoid epidemiological crises.  
While on the whole relief activities are recognized as having been effectively 
coordinated, there were critical gaps and problems associated with the organization and 
provision of relief.  
In the initial days, relief was given only to those registered as tsunami affected, 
and people who had fled their homes post-tsunami, returning after a few days, had 
considerable difficulty in registering themselves. Further, at the start, aid reached only fish 
worker communities, while several other communities who had lost their means of 
livelihood, but perhaps not property and life, were overlooked completely. There were 
reports that in many villages, even if aid is distributed equally to all, it was usually 
collected back later, and distributed to only those who lost assets like boats and 
catamarans (Sampath, n.d., Towards Equality, para.2). Relief supplies often did not reach 
villages that were situated at a distance from the main road. There was also a fair amount 
of duplication of work and dumping of relief material due to uncoordinated relief 
distribution by a plethora of agencies. Needs of vulnerable groups such as women, children 
and the aged were typically overlooked in relief camps.   
While initially schools, colleges, marriage halls etc., functioned as relief camps, 
people were soon moved out to temporary shelters. With regard to temporary shelters, 
haste to complete construction by the 15th January, 2005, appears to have undone an 
otherwise well-framed policy. Typically, temporary shelters were very hot, poorly 
ventilated, had no flooring, inadequate water and sanitation facilities, and insufficient 
lighting. The shelters were built mostly on low-lying areas, and were flooded during the 
monsoons in 2005. A year after the disaster, many families continue to reside in these 
shelters, and are likely to do so for an at least another three to six months. While some 
civil society organizations have been involved in upgrading the quality and facilities of 
these shelters, the overall experience has been one in which even widely known standards 
such as the Sphere standards have not been adhered to.  
Rehabilitation – Housing Reconstruction and Livelihood Recovery 
1. Housing Rehabilitation: The Relocation Conundrum  
Housing reconstruction is being implemented in partnership with civil society 
organizations in all affected districts, except Chennai and Thiruvallur. The housing 
rehabilitation policy initially brought out envisaged the permanent relocation of affected 
communities in order to incorporate safety considerations, and in keeping with the Coastal 
Regulation Zone (CRZ) notification16.  
In the face of strong opposition from civil society on the grounds that relocation 
would have a direct, negative impact on fishing livelihoods, a new GO was issued making 
relocation optional for people residing within 500 meters of the high tide line. However, 
people residing within 200 meters of the high tide line would not receive any government 
assistance for repair/reconstruction unless they relinquished the site and house, in return 
for a new house beyond the 200 meters zone.  
The housing rehabilitation policy is evidently attempting to address several 
concerns, often conflicting, ranging from livelihoods and safety, to environmental and legal 
considerations. However, the fact that the policy excludes people living within the 200-
meter zone, a section of the affected population that is extremely vulnerable given its 
proximity to the sea, is a matter of concern.  The State would have done well to rather 
adopt a policy that allows partnership with the people and civil society organizations to 
create disaster resistant housing for such vulnerable populations.  
2. Housing Rehabilitation: Procedural Complications, Quality and Community Participation 
Acquiring land for resettlement17 of communities, despite a special directive 
permitting district administrations to acquire land through private negotiation, has been 
very difficult given the scarcity of land and high land prices on the coast.  Difficulties in 
land acquisition have led to delays in allocation of habitations (for reconstruction) to NGOs, 
and the accompanying compulsion on people to stay for a prolonged period in the 
temporary shelters. To circumvent this, district administrations have been informally 
encouraging communities to opt for in situ rehabilitation, even within the 200 meters zone. 
Quality of construction has been another issue of concern, particularly when the 
implementing agency hands over construction to a building contractor and removes itself 
from the scene, leaving room for malpractice. The government’s stand that it will not 
provide assistance for reconstruction with 200 meters of the high tide line is especially 
problematic in light of quality concerns, as this implies that there are no technical 
guidelines, and allocation and monitoring mechanisms governing reconstruction here. When 
it comes to site selection, criteria regarding distance from sea and elevation are often not 
followed, and quality of land is at times not acceptable – for instance, wetlands and saltpan 
lands have been allocated in some areas. In totality, inadequate monitoring, and the lack of 
political will to enforce minimum standards, has impacted housing reconstruction 
negatively.  
Participation of the affected community typically remains at a minimum, despite 
the policy recommending early allocation and linking of sites with beneficiaries to allow 
them to be a part of the process right from the start. Consultation processes for design, lay 
out planning etc., are not always followed, or involve only power centers in the 
community. The housing policy also favors external organization involvement over owner-
driven18 housing rehabilitation. Further, the ownership of the land remains with the state 
government, with the district administration reserving the right to transfer ownership to 
the beneficiaries as and when it deems fit.  
3. Livelihoods 
A range of livelihoods across the Tamil Nadu coast was affected by the tsunami. 
While fishery based livelihoods were the first to be recognized as requiring rehabilitation 
assistance, it soon became apparent that a large percentage of people on the coast 
dependent on other livelihoods, particularly agriculture and informal sector occupations, 
were affected as well.  
Despite this recognition, rehabilitation of fishery-based livelihoods19 has continued 
to receive the maximum attention from both the state and civil society organizations. The 
focus in this sector has been on replacement of assets, i.e., provision of boats and fishing 
equipment. The combined and, at times, uncoordinated efforts of the State and civil 
society to supply boats to fish workers has led to an increase in the total stock of fishing 
boats in Tamil Nadu, with possible long-term, negative consequences for fishery in Tamil 
Nadu which has already been experiencing stagnation due to over-exploitation. This over 
supply, often driven by the desire of civil society organizations to foster equity by giving 
boats to those who were earlier laborers, has also led to a shortage of fishing boat crew, 
with the result that young boys are being pulled out of school to work on the boats.  Issues 
related to quality are being seen – boats are often not seaworthy, as organizations seem to 
compromise on quality in an effort to increase numbers. There are also issues relating to 
the lack of suitability of boats to local preferences and sea conditions.  The fisheries 
rehabilitation policy has also not addressed deeper issues associated with depleting fishery 
resources, sea safety20 and disaster preparedness21.           
Accurate damage estimation has been problematic22 as a large proportion of the 
craft were unregistered and without any records. To circumvent difficulties created by the 
lack of existing data, the rehabilitation process has been largely routed through the 
traditional fish worker panchayats (these are community institutions different from the 
elected panchayats) that govern these communities. While these have greatly facilitated 
identification of beneficiaries and implementation of rehabilitation packages, they are not 
egalitarian in several respects. Women do not have a place in these traditional panchayats, 
and so are often left out during rehabilitation processes. While the panchayat does support 
them for their basic needs, this support is usually at the subsistence level.  
With respect to agriculture, it is widely believed that the official estimates of 
affected lands are far less than the actual figures. The compensation for crop damage is 
inadequate, and the efficacy23 of the desalination packages provided by the government 
still under question. Agricultural laborers have been subsumed in the larger discourse on 
agricultural land, with typically only landowners being considered as tsunami affected. 
While in some areas relief packages did reach laborers, nothing much has been done for 
them in terms of livelihood rehabilitation.  
The situation of people engaged in petty trades, service provision, allied services 
such as fish curing, vending etc., and working in saltpan lands is similar. Relief packages 
were announced for these groups, but little is available by means of livelihood 
rehabilitation, as it is believed that these dependent livelihoods would pick up as the 
fishing economy revived. It is also being seen that claiming compensation for loss of 
livelihood, particularly when one is a part of the unorganized sector is very problematic 
because of issues related to evidence and proof24. Getting losses certified by the 
administration, or getting people to vouch for them during enquiries has been a difficult 
proposition25 for itinerant vendors and service providers. Some civil society organizations 
have been involved in providing legal aid services to those who have not received their 
entitlements. Alternative livelihood programs are also being explored.  
 What cuts across the entire experience of livelihood rehabilitation is that both the 
government and civil society organizations have largely adopted property-centric relief and 
rehabilitation policies, with the result that livelihood rehabilitation packages 
predominantly reach only people who possess assets such as boats, land, shops etc. Several 
groups that contribute to the coastal economy by providing their labor and skills have all 
found themselves sidelined and disregarded. 
An Overview of Accountability and Transparency in Tsunami Response 
 The working of the various agencies involved in the relief and rehabilitation process 
has not been free of concerns related to transparency and accountability.  
 There is a widely perceived need for civil society organizations to be follow rigorous 
procedures with regard to financial management and related transparency, particularly in 
the context of the large sums of money that have been received in the wake of the 
tsunami, a process that has been made easier by the waiver of the traditional checks 
otherwise placed by the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) of 1976. Civil society 
organizations have been typically reluctant to share information on resources received and 
utilized with other civil society actors, often saying that they are accountable to only the 
government.  
 People also voice concerns relating to issues such as poor quality and slow pace of 
work, non-participatory approaches and a general unwillingness to share information. The 
visibility26 as well as the financial resources that tsunami related work seems to have, has 
led to intense competition to ‘acquire’ villages and spend massive budgets, often in a non-
consultative and uncoordinated manner (International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, 2005, as cited in Anand, 2005). It is also troubling that despite many 
claims by NGOs that their focus of work and advocacy is on vulnerable groups, issues like 
the conditions of agricultural laborers, and lacunae in old age pension schemes have not 
received adequate attention in policy.  
 While the participation of affected people is widely upheld as a principle, in 
practice however, it is not always realized due to the nature of institutional arrangements 
around financial reporting and obligations. One reason cited by NGOs as a hindrance in 
giving full play to participatory processes was the necessity to achieve targets and meet 
project deadlines. It also appears that lack of mutual familiarity and knowledge of local 
conditions makes it all the more difficult to foster mutual trust, an essential condition for 
effective participation27.  
 The nature of institutional arrangements governing donor-partner relationships also 
affects relevance28 and effectiveness of programs. Contractual obligations, including 
sanctioned budget lines, and conditions regarding program type and implementation, have 
had significant bearing on the level of flexibility in program administration. It is commonly 
seen that there is minimal scope to make alterations in the program, or make mid-course 
corrections because of various conditions imposed by donor agencies.  
 Relevance of programs is also affected by the enthusiasm of many organizations to 
apply new knowledge without researching it carefully, and to bring about social change in 
the community29. Further, one finds that many of the agencies engaged in post-tsunami 
relief and rehabilitation do not have the experience, expertise or knowledge of the coastal 
economy, social systems and structures required to design and implement meaningful 
programs. When such organizations ‘influence’ their local partners to take up ‘specific’ 
areas of work or modes of implementation, intervention often becomes inappropriate to 
local conditions.  
 What emerges from these experiences is the value of different types of civil society 
organizations confining themselves to clearly defined roles. There seems considerable merit 
in the argument that donor agencies that are not familiar with local conditions should not 
take on the role of a direct implementing agency. Ideally, while a development support 
agency brings in the financial resources, a local development organization must work to 
facilitate the rehabilitation process in partnership with the community.  
 With respect to the state, the administration seems to have earned a fairly clean 
chit in terms of accountability and transparency in its working. While this could be 
attributed to the fact that the government has, for the most part, stayed away from direct, 
beneficiary oriented implementation of rehabilitation, it is also true that several 
mechanisms have been set up to ensure a certain level of transparency in the disaster 
response. For one, the government has taken a deliberate decision to partner with civil 
society organizations in the rehabilitation process, and this, along with several other 
monitoring measures, has gone a long way in minimizing corruption in the delivery of aid.  
 With respect to financial transparency, the government has exhibited a great deal 
of willingness to share information. However, some ambiguity exists among civil society 
regarding the exact quantum and utilization of funds received from various sources such as 
the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the Central Government. The government, 
being obliged to set the highest standards of transparency and accountability, should take 
immediate steps to clear this ambiguity, by perhaps issuing a White Paper on this question.   
D. Vulnerabilities and Exclusion 
The ongoing process of relief and rehabilitation has seen the exclusion of several 
groups of people because of a complex matrix of reasons relating to factors as diverse as 
inherent vulnerabilities and active discrimination, as well as systemic deficiencies. 
 The special needs of vulnerable groups such as women, children, the disabled, and 
the aged were not considered in the relief phase. For instance, the relief packages 
distributed did not contain even children’s clothing. Older people found it difficult to 
collect relief packages in camps as they were pushed around. A study conducted by 
HelpAge International during the relief phase reveals that a main reason underlying the 
invisibility of older people is the absence of data disaggregated by age (HelpAge 
International, 2005). Women faced several problems, including those related to lack of 
privacy and appropriate sanitation facilities. 
 The Tamil Nadu government has, however, done well to respond to civil society’s 
concerns about child trafficking in the guise of adoption after disasters, and has directed 
that all affected children are to remain their home districts, and that all orphans without 
caretakers are to be housed only in government orphanages.  
 With regard to the elderly, the government’s old age pension scheme that was 
extended with immediate effect to all eligible tsunami affected people who were not 
already covered is severely lacking. Under this only people above the age of 60 who do not 
have a son above the age of 18 years are eligible for pension. The scheme completely 
ignores the fact that many elderly, destitute people are estranged from their families and 
sons, and so are as helpless and vulnerable as those without sons. Further, the fact that the 
policy mentions sons rather than daughters is contrary to the principle of gender justice 
that should be the cornerstone of an equitable rehabilitation process. The disabled receive 
no mention in the rehabilitation policy, other than directions issued ordering the 
distribution of aid devices.   
 There are reports of Dalits facing discrimination during the relief phase, and being 
denied even food aid on the grounds that there were no deaths among them (Alternative 
Law Forum, n.d., Problems of Relief Distribution in the Immediate Aftermath, para.2). In 
the rehabilitation phase, the prospect of relocation is leading to caste related problems. 
With certain fish worker communities opting for relocation, identifying suitable sites 
becomes problematic when Dalit communities are found between the new site and the 
sea30.  
 Women’s work has not been recognized by rehabilitation programs (Oxfam, 2005, 
p.7). Livelihood restoration measures have focused on replacement of assets, thus 
excluding women who rarely possess assets in their names. Often the disbursement of relief 
and rehabilitation packages is controlled by fish worker traditional panchayats that are 
dominated by men, leading to further exclusion of women (Manecksha, 2005, para.14). 
Even when women do get compensation and relief packages, other family members 
typically take over the resources that come in (Ibid, para.8). It must be noted here, 
however, that the government has taken several measures to incorporate women’s 
concerns in the rehabilitation policies31.  
 The case of the Irulas, a semi-nomadic adivasi (tribal) community, reveals with a 
great deal of clarity an important factor influencing exclusion in disaster response. The 
Irulas, (several members of which are engaged in backwater/catamaran fishing near the 
shore, or work as casual labor on fishing boats)  as a group were, and continue to be 
overlooked in the relief and rehabilitation processes.  
As a community, the Irulas have long been invisible given their nomadic habits, and 
scattered, sparsely populated settlements. They rarely possess proofs of identity such as 
ration cards32, voter’s identification cards, community certificates33 etc. Many of the 
households do not even feature in the Census as the Irula settlements are usually located 
far from the main roads, and people are usually not available at home during the day. 
After the tsunami, Irulas whose houses were affected had nothing to show — they 
lived in huts that were completely washed away, leaving no signs of the destruction that 
had been wreaked. Their settlements are dispersed, so identification of the affected and 
distribution of relief become huge tasks. A variety of evidence was required to get 
compensation — house on patta 34land, recognition of the village by a panchayat (Irulas live 
in dispersed, isolated clusters, unrecognized by the VAO or a panchayat) and other 
government identification cards — none of which was available with them. The Irulas are 
also, by nature, a reserved community, and are reluctant to even speak about the losses 
they have suffered in the tsunami to outsiders. In short, they lack the ability to sell 
themselves, and this when contrasted with the highly organized and articulate fish worker 
community, puts the Irulas even more at a disadvantage. It has also been noticed that even 
civil society organizations are not very eager to support Irula rehabilitation possibly 
because their settlements are scattered and sparsely populated. It is easier to get numbers 
(in terms of families and people), identify beneficiaries, distribute relief and rehabilitation 
packages, and raise resources in the densely packed fish worker settlements. 
Understanding Exclusion: The Politics of Information and Definition 
The Tamil Nadu experience shows that exclusion in post-disaster situations is linked 
to an interaction of factors such as inherent vulnerabilities, data integrity, and definition of 
‘affected’.  
In the first days after the tsunami, no relief reached, a particular Hindu village in 
the predominantly Christian coastline of Kanyakumari, as the district administration 
depended on the Church35 for information about affected settlements. This village did not 
figure in Church records as the Church maintained detailed records only of the Christian 
settlements. As the administration did not possess readily accessible, accurate geo-
demographic data, it relied, and continues to rely, on the Church for records, thereby 
creating a situation in which there are bound to be exclusions. The neglect of the Irula 
community can also be attributed to similar reasons — only a hazy, distorted picture of 
these people exists with the government, and hence its inability to proactively identify 
them as ‘affected’ and address their concerns. 
As can be seen from these instances, and from the situation on the ground, the 
underlying issue emerges to be one of data integrity. Detailed and accurate demographic 
(inclusive of socio-economic and geographic information) data and other relevant records 
are not available with the government, and where available, are often not accurate. 
This deficit in data integrity is exacerbated by a skewed understanding of the term 
‘affected’ that is based on the premise that only settlements that were damaged by water, 
and that only people who had lost lives and property were ‘affected’. This visibility-
influenced definition has in turn directed the manner in which compensation, relief and 
rehabilitation processes were and continue to be designed and implemented – there is 
stress on provision of evidence that one has lost assets. Added to this is the flawed 
conceptualization of the ‘coastal community’ as a homogeneous whole (namely fish 
workers), rather than a vibrant system of inherently different groups, held together by geo-
economical links.  
While corrective measures have been taken to widen the scope of the definition of 
‘affected’, they have not been completely effective in reaching excluded groups as most 
systems and mechanisms governing the relief and rehabilitation process are still based on 
the original understanding of affected, as well as on the initial impact assessments and 
registrations of affected people.  
E. Tsunami Response in Tamil Nadu: Consolidating the Experiences 
It is clear from the Tamil Nadu experience that a responsive and proactive 
government, that devolves powers and responsibilities to the administration, is a necessary 
condition for effective disaster response. Further, institutional autonomy, and decision-
making free of political interference, are crucial in fostering people sensitive and effective 
relief and rehabilitation.  
It also appears that a lot depends on the perspective, approach and capacity of 
individual officers in key positions; however, this over reliance on the ability of the 
individual occupying a particular office is not without its dangers. It is also necessary to 
examine means of extrapolating the learnings of such officers to an institutional level in 
order to create a common skills and knowledge base.  
While an efficient and non-corrupt administration is a necessary condition for 
effective disaster response, particularly in the relief phase, a much deeper engagement is 
needed with local elected institutions – the elected panchayats – to ensure equitable and 
inclusive rehabilitation, and to counter several of the problems seen commonly. The 73rd 
Constitutional Amendment vests with the village panchayat the obligatory function of 
disaster management and preparedness; panchayats possess the potential to implement the 
rehabilitation process at the grassroots level, and are well placed to foster community 
participation; they can also play a key role in creating detailed demographic databases, and 
are perhaps the institutions best suited to monitor reconstruction, as well as incorporate 
long-term development goals in the rehabilitation agenda.  
However, in practice, one finds that in most post-disaster situations, like in the 
case of the tsunami, elected panchayats (as different from traditional panchayats) are not 
given the space and resources to facilitate the reconstruction process. Despite these 
obstacles, in Tamil Nadu, there is newly emerging evidence36 that in places where 
panchayats have been active, the recovery process has progressed much faster and in a far 
more accountable manner. It is therefore vital that the involvement of these local bodies in 
disaster response is institutionalized in practice, and that they are equipped with the 
necessary capabilities and resources.  
 This study of tsunami response in Tamil Nadu also shows that a vibrant interface 
and partnership between the state and civil society is critical to ensure that people’s 
concerns are addressed by both policy and practice, as well as to minimize corruption. This 
synergy needs to be fostered by both the state and civil society proactively. Also important 
is the need for effective communication channels, coordination, dialogue and information 
among and within civil society organizations to avoid duplication, wastage of resources and 
competition, and to optimize individual efforts.  
  With regard to the several instances of poor quality of intervention, it is 
inexcusable that such issues continue to plague disaster response despite the widespread 
knowledge and awareness that exists about standards in humanitarian aid, for instance, the 
Sphere Standards. What is patent, however, is that, given that post-disaster situations are 
characterized by flux, a great deal of flexibility in terms of rehabilitation policy, the nature 
of interventions, budgets and timelines, and even program objectives, is required to allow 
for the adapting of response interventions to address ground level realities as well as the 
true needs of people.  
 Further, there is a strong case for civil society organizations to put in a lot more 
effort in fostering transparency in their interventions. At the end of the day, all funding 
they receive and all programs they administer are in real terms meant for the people. 
Therefore, they should be first on line to share with others all details of their functioning, 
and in fact should welcome the involvement of the affected community in monitoring their 
interventions and programs. 
 Moving on to the questions of exclusion, what counts is the capacity of the system 
to deal with this exclusion, and for this, accurate and reliable disaggregated data on 
various lines in crucial, as is the willingness and capacity to alter policy to suit changing 
needs. Post-tsunami, it is strikingly clear that there is a pressing need for detailed and 
inclusive geo-demographic and socio-economic data collection, and vulnerability mapping 
as a resource base for disaster preparedness. The importance of avoiding rigid and 
unalterable definitions of ‘affected’ is also evidenced by this experience. 
The importance of disaster preparedness has never been so clearly brought out as 
in the case of the tsunami. Preparedness is needed at various levels; for one, there needs 
to be preparedness to respond, in terms of institutional structures and systems, personnel 
as well as material resources. Community preparedness is another crucial aspect. The first 
few hours after the tsunami showed that it was the community itself that was the first to 
respond, as in the case of all disasters. Communities need to be prepared so that not only 
are the impacts of disasters mitigated, but also so that they are knowledgeable about how 
to respond. Preparedness also includes addressing vulnerabilities — development of 
capabilities, reducing poverty, access to insurance, early warning systems, etc., all form a 
part of this. And at the broadest level, the need for a holistic and integrated policy on 
disasters that covers all aspects of prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response 
cannot be ignored.  
End notes 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on the report “The State and Civil Society in Disaster Response: An Analysis of 
the Tamil Nadu Tsunami Experience” published in December 2005 by the Tata Institute of Social 
Sciences. The authors of this paper, along with Karthik Venkatesh, undertook the field work for, and 
the writing of this report.  See full report at http://www.tiss.edu/TISS_Tsunami_Report_2005.pdf  
2 All figures in this paragraph are drawn from the Tamil Government website 
http://www.tn.gov.in/tsunami/damages.htm  
3 It must be noted that damage figures have been constantly evolving, and reconstruction programs 
being currently implemented are not necessarily based on these figures.  
4 Chennai, Kanyakumari, Nagapattinam and Cuddalore.  
5 The District Administration is headed by the District Collector and Magistrate, a senior officer of the 
Indian Administrative Services (IAS) cadre.   
6 For loss of life and injury. 
7 School fee waivers, special deposits for orphaned children and young women, pensions for widows, 
destitute women and elderly etc.  
8 Given the fact that policy frameworks are always not consistent with local conditions, district 
administrations have been very flexible in allowing necessary adaptations in implementation of 
rehabilitation programs. A case in point is the reconstruction of houses within the 200m CRZ zone in 
Kanyakumari (See section on housing rehabilitation) 
9 Constitutionally recognized local self-governing bodies at the village level. 
10 Through the public-private partnership framework.  
11 Literally meaning ‘broken people’, Dalit (like Black), is a political identity of a section of people 
formerly referred to as ‘untouchables’ or ‘outcastes’ i.e., those outside the “Caste” Hindu society. 
12 For instance, older men were marrying minor orphaned girls for the special deposits made in their 
name by the government as a part of tsunami rehabilitation. 
13 State policy also lays down minimum standards for disaster resistant housing, guidelines relating to 
community participation, insurance, monitoring and third party auditing. 
14 In the urban areas of Chennai and Thiruvallur, however, all reconstruction is being undertaken by the 
government.  
15 Such as the Kanyakumari Rehabilitation Resource Centre, NGO Coordination and Resource Centre 
(NCRC) in Nagapattinam, and the Chennai NGOs Coordination Cell. 
16 The Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification, issued in 1991 under the Environment Protection 
Act, 1986, regulates the types of activities and land uses permitted in the coastal regulation zone (up to 
500 metres of the High Tide Line). The notification, however, allows for fish workers settlements and 
associated activities in these zones.  
17 The question of secondary displacement caused by land acquisition for tsunami rehabilitation has not 
been explored by this study, but definitely is a concern requiring examination. 
18 The rehabilitation experience after the Gujarat Earthquake of January 26, 2001, shows that owner-
driven housing, with financial and technical support from, and monitoring by the State is often the best 
option for rehabilitation in terms of resulting in sustainable habitations that are in keeping with 
people’s needs.  
19 This discussion on rehabilitation of fishery based livelihoods draws extensively from policy notes 
released by the NGO Co-ordination Resource Centre, Nagapattinam.  
20 Such as search and rescue operations for stranded fish workers. 
21 For instance, by means of insurance cover.  
22 The process of delivering relief and rehabilitation in a manner that resources are spent judiciously, 
while ensuring that all affected people get their entitlements has posed quite a challenge to the 
government. Given the absence of reliable population data and records, the primary difficulty lay in 
identifying beneficiaries and verifying whether their losses were genuine. The government has relied 
heavily on community based institutions to get data on damages and affected people.   
23 Civil society organizations are exploring organic techniques for restoration of agricultural lands, 
particularly in Nagapattinam district.  
24 In the agricultural sector, compensation for loss of livestock is sanctioned only if the claimant has 
photographic evidence of the death of the animal – in the wake of the tsunami, most bodies were 
washed away, and those that remained were given a hasty burial to prevent disease outbreaks, making it 
next to impossible to produce such proof.  
25 A case in point is the plight of Narikurava (gypsy) vendors in the tourist town of Mahabalipuram 
near Chennai city. The tsunami waters washed away their wares — artifacts and costume jewellery. 
                                                                                                                                            
But they have been unable to access compensation as there is no one to vouch for their losses — not 
only do they keep moving, they are also viewed with distrust and contempt by the mainstream. 
26 It was pointed out by many, that NGOs prefer to go to Nagapattinam, Cuddalore and Kanyakumari 
as they receive media attention. In contrast, in areas like Ramanathapuram or Vizhupuram, Tiruvallur, 
Kanchipuram, one finds very few NGOs, and that too, only local NGOs that do not have much capacity 
to raise or spend money. 
27Many organizations have tried to circumvent this problem by hiring locals, ideally people from the 
affected community itself, as their outreach workers. 
28 Meaning the extent to which the program meets people’s felt needs. 
29A case in point is the virtual flood of surveys and administration of psycho-social interventions that 
followed the tsunami. While many of the psychosocial care interventions were sensitively designed,29 
there were others that were not so. Several months later, affected people still recount the trauma of 
having to repeat the same stories, draw the same pictures and listen to strangers asking one to ‘cry and 
get it out’, in many cases, several times over with different agencies and organisations. Another 
instance is that of the oversupply of boats caused by the desire to foster equity that in turn has led to 
young boys being removed from school to work as crew.  
 
30 Typically, Dalit settlements are always leeward of fishing villages.  
31 For instance, all houses are to be registered in the names of both the husband and wife; any transfer 
of the wife’s share to the husband is void.  
32 An official document issued by the Government that entitles holders to subsidized food from the 
Public Distribution System.  
33 A certificate issued by a competent government authority that validates the caste/community identity 
of an individual. This entitles members of many marginalized groups to benefits of affirmative action. 
34 A title deed. 
35 The Catholic Church is a very well established institution in this area, and played a crucial role in 
coordinating relief and rehabilitation processes.  
36 S.Parasuraman, personal communication, January 4, 2006. 
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